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Abstract 
Formal analysis of the political economy of trade policy was substantially redirected by the 
appearance of Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman’s 1994 paper, “Protection for Sale”. 
Before that article a fairly wide range of approaches were favoured by various authors on 
various issues, but afterwards, the vast majority of theoretical tracts on endogenous trade 
policy have used the Protection for Sale framework (PFS for short) as their main vehicle. The 
reason, of course, is that the framework is both respectable – because its microfoundations 
are distinctly firmer than were those of the earlier lobbying approaches – and it is very easy 
to work with. Despite the popularity of the PFS framework, it appears that no one has 
presented a simple diagram that illustrates how the PFS frameworks and explains why it is so 
easy. This short note aims to remedy that ommission. 
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1. Introduction and Motivation 
 
Formal analysis of the political economy of trade policy was substantially redirected by 
the appearance of Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman’s 1994 paper, “Protection for 
Sale” in the American Economic Review (Grossman and Helpman, 1994). Before that 
article, a fairly wide range of approaches were favoured by various authors on various 
issues; see, for example the political support function approach of Hillman (1989) and 
Long and Vousden (1991), and the formal lobbying approach of Findlay and Wellisz, 
(1982). After the article, the vast majority of theoretical tracts on endogenous trade policy 
have used the Protection for Sale framework (PFS for short) as their main vehicle. The 
reason, of course, is that the framework is both respectable – because its 
microfoundations are distinctly firmer than were those of the earlier lobbying approaches 
– and it is very easy to work with.  
Despite the popularity of the PFS framework, it appears that no one has presented 
a simple diagram that illustrates how the PFS framework works and explains why it is so 
easy. That is the goal of this short note.  
 
 
2. The PFS Framework with Equations 
 
The PFS framework is firmly in the so-called lobbying approach to endogenous trade 
policy (as opposed to the voting approach). As such, it abstracts from electoral politics, 
assuming instead that the government is entrenched or at least that every elected 
government will respond to lobbying in the same way.  
Specifically, we model lobbying as a menu auction (Bernheim and Whinston, 
1986), and we assume that all industrial sectors are perfectly organised in the Grossman-
Helpman sense (i.e. all firms in a sector act as one when it comes to political 
contributions). Contributions made by sector-m are denoted as Cm. Consumers and the 
untaxed A-sector are unorganised and thus do not lobby.  
 
2.1 Underlying economy (almost partial equilibrium) 
 
To focus on the political economy aspects, the PFS framework assumes an extremely 
simple underlying economy.  
The PFS framework assumes preferences of all factor owners are identical and 
quasilinear so as to eliminate general equilibrium considerations stemming from income 
effects. It also assumes preferences are separable sector-by-sector so as to eliminate 
cross-price effects on demand. Symbolically, the typical direct utility function and 
corresponding indirect utility function are: 
(1)  ∑∑ == +=+= ni iini ii psEvcucu 110 ][,][  
where n is the number of non-numeraire sectors, the ui sub-utility functions for each non-
numeraire sector, E is expenditure, and si(pi) are sector-specific consumer surplus 
functions.  
For the direct utility function, u, c0 is consumption of the numeraire good and cj is 
consumption of typical good j. One of the many nice features of the almost-partial-
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equilibrium demand structure is that consumer surplus perfectly captures the welfare 
impact of price changes. Indeed, the typical indirect utility function is just income, 
denoted as E, plus the sum of sector-specific consumer surplus measures, si(pi).  
To simplify things on the supply side, the PFS model adopts a Ricardo-Viner set-
up. This eliminates general equilibrium supply-side effects because labour’s price is 
pinned down by productivity in the numeraire sector and each sector-specific factor is 
paid the Ricardian rent. This means that E for a typical consumer equals her labour 
income wL plus her share of tariff revenue, r, plus the payment to whatever sector-
specific factors she owns. 
Finally, to further simplify the underlying economy, the original PFS framework 
adopts the small-country fiction, that is, the border prices the nation faces are unrelated to 
the volume of the nation’s purchases and sales.  
 
2.2 Government’s objective, lobbies and contributions 
 
In the PFS framework (see Grossman and Helpman 1994), the government’s objective 
function Ω is a weighted sum of standard utilitarian social welfare function W, and 
lobbying contributions, namely: 
(2)  ][ iij pCaW Λ∈Σ+=Ω  
where capital lambda, Λ, is the set of sectors that are organised politically (and thus can 
make political contributions) and Ci is the contribution of sector i.  
One of the very nice features of the PFS framework is that it disciplines the range 
of contribution schedules. Specifically, it presents sophisticated reasoning from contract 
theory to argue that it is natural to expect each lobby’s contribution to be ‘truthful’ in the 
sense that each lobby’s contribution must vary with tariffs in the same way that the 
lobby’s objective function varies tariffs. In particular, the form of the contribution 
schedule is exactly equal to the industry/lobby’s welfare minus a constant, B.  
 
Awkwardness in lobbyist’s contribution schedules 
 
Contributions in the PFS model are directly and intuitively related to what one might 
assume is the main purpose of lobbying – raising the price of goods that the industry sells 
by getting protection from low priced imports. However, the PFS model also has to 
confront an awkward implication of its assumption of identical preferences for all factor 
owners. In the general PFS case, lobbies care about more than just getting protection for 
the goods they sell. They also fine-tune their contributions in order to lower the cost of 
living facing lobby members. Namely, the PFS contributions are: 
(3)  ( ) iiiiii BLpsprNppC −+++= ][][][][ απ  
where π is total the Ricardian surplus earned by firms in sector i, N is the total mass of 
people in the nation, and αi is the fraction of the population that owns the sector-specific 
asset of sector=i.  
The first and third terms in (3) are sensible bits. Plainly, a lobby’s contributions 
should be directly related to its rents, πi, and since a sensible model would not require 
lobbies to contribute all their Ricardian rents to the government, the PFS framework 
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allows contributions to be reduced by a constant, Bi. This allows the lobby to retain some 
of the fruits of their lobbying without violating the truthfulness constraint.  
The Ice Cream Clause.  The second term in (3), however, is awkward. It is there 
since the PFS model assumes that lobbies maximise the utility of the owners of the 
industry-specific factor who are also consumers. This means that the contribution 
schedule includes elements of the owners’ indirect utility function that involve prices in 
other sectors – specifically, the per-capita distribution of tariff revenue, r, the per capita 
consumer surplus, s, and the per capita labour endowment L. The awkwardness is 
twofold. First, it introduces a strange element to lobbyists’ concerns, what might be 
called the ‘ice cream’ clause. For example, this implies that the steel lobby would slightly 
lower the amount of money it donates to the government for any given steel tariff if the 
government chooses a slightly higher ice cream tariff. This does not add to the model’s 
appeal. Secondly, the awkward term is also responsible for most of the complexity in the 
general PFS framework. The reason is that it creates a general equilibrium connection 
among sectors in a model that is otherwise a juxtaposition of partial equilibrium markets.  
Fortunately, this awkward term is multiplied by αiN, where αi is the share of the 
population, N, that owns the industry-i specific factor. This is important since it allows 
one to remove the awkwardness by assuming that αi is so small that it can be well 
approximated as zero. In this case, intuitively appealing case, a lobby’s objective is to 
maximise the industry’s producer surplus less lobbying costs.  
The original Helpman-Grossman article calls this ’example 3’ and notes that this 
assumption has a downside in that it eliminates ‘political rivalry among special interest 
groups.’ However, this is not much of a downside since the rivalry considered in the 
general PFS model is only of the ‘ice cream clause’ variety. Even the general PFS model 
fails to capture the sort of rivalry one often observes in OECD nations. For example, US 
carmakers resist US steel protection since it raises input costs. This is not captured by the 
general PFS model since a lobby only cares about protection in other sectors due its 
impact on consumer prices and government tariff revenue.  
 
2.3 PFS-lite (Grossman-Helpman 1994 Example 3) 
 
Under the appealing assumption that lobbies care only about rents (i.e. αi=0 for all i), the 
PFS framework is extremely simple. Indeed, the endogenous tariff can be solved market 
by market. In this, PFS-lite case, the government’s objective function is identical to a 
‘politically realistic objective function’ where the producer surplus of organised 
industries receives a higher weight in the government’s maximisation problem.1 
Specifically, the weight on producer surplus in unorganised sectors as well as on 
consumer surplus and tariff revenue is ‘a’; the weight on producer surplus in organised 
sectors is 1+a. Thus the government chooses tariffs to maximise:  
(4)  ( ) CONSTANTSpapapspraN iiiiiiiiii +Σ++Σ++=Ω Λ∈Λ∉ ][)1(][][][ ππ  
This, of course, is exactly why the PFS framework is so easy to work with. It is, in 
essence, just a social welfare maximization exercise with a politically realistic social 
welfare function.  
                                                 
1 See Baldwin (1987). 
 4
The first order condition for the choice of the tariff in typical sector that is organised is: 
(5)  ( ) ][']['][']['0 iiiiiiii pppNspNra ππ +++=  
Given the small-economy fiction, the derivatives here are simple. The change in tariff 
revenue, Nr’, equals the level of imports plus the level of the tariff, τi, times the change in 
imports. That is,  
(6)  
i
i
iiii dp
dM
MpNr τ+=]['  
Where Mi is sector-i imports and dMi/dpi is the change in imports in response to a 
domestic price change. As usual, the change in total consumer surplus is minus the level 
of consumption, and the change in producer surplus is the level of domestic production, 
namely: 
(7)  iiiiii ZpDpNs == ][';][' π  
where Di and Zi are consumption and production respectively.  
Adding the first three terms and cancelling, we see that the parameter ‘a’ 
multiples a negative number; in particular the terms in the parentheses in (5) equal 
τi(dMi/dp)<0 which is identical to τi(dDi/dp-Zi/dp), where dDi/dp and dZi/dp are the 
slopes of the domestic demand and supply curves respectively . We can think of this as 
the ‘marginal economic cost of the tariff’, or MEC for short, since it is the marginal 
reduction in utilitarian social welfare due to a rise in the tariff.  
The fourth term in (5) is just the level of output, so it is positive and we refer to it 
as the ‘marginal political benefit’, or MPB, since it represents the marginal increase in 
contributions due a marginal increase in the tariff. Note that the MPB curve corresponds 
to the supply curve since the marginal increase in Ricardian rent is always equal to the 
level of domestic output. 
More specifically, tacking the demand curve as Di=aD-bDpi in sector-i and the 
supply curve as Zi=bSpi, where bD is the slope of the demand curve and bS as the slope of 
the supply curve in a given industry (we take them to be identical across industries to 
reduce notational clutter), we can rewrite (5) as: 
(8)  )()( i
w
iSSDi pbbba ττ +=+  
where the left-hand side is the MPC and the right-hand side the MPB. Solving, we get the 
specific tariff as a fraction of the world price to be: 
(9)  
SSD
S
w
i
i
bbba
b
p −+= )(
τ  
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Figure 1: The political equilibrium tariff in the PFS-lite model 
The MEC and MPB curves are plotted in Figure 1. The MPB curve is upward sloped and 
in fact is identical to the domestic supply curve. The MEC curve, -aτi(-Dp+Zp), starts 
from zero (since the marginal economic loss from rising the tariff from zero is zero) and 
it rises as long as the slopes of the domestic supply and demand curve do not change too 
much. In fact, there is no cost, in terms of foregone insight, to assuming that the supply 
and demand curves are linear, in which case the MEC curve is a positively sloped linear 
curve as shown in the figure.   
 
2.4 Determining the contributions 
 
One of the most recalcitrant implications of the abovementioned ‘ice cream clause’ in the 
general PFS model is the difficulty it imparts into the determination of the level of 
contributions, in particular, the Bi’s. The procedure for determining the B’s in the special 
case of two lobbies is laid out in detail in the published article (Grossman and Helpman 
1994) and the general procedure is laid out in the working paper referred to therein. 
Despite two figures and an extensive discussion in the published article, it is probably fair 
to say that the procedure remains a mystery to most readers. By contrast, determining Bi 
in the PFS model without the ‘ice cream clause’ is trivial.  
It helps to remember that the PFS model is, in its essence, applied contract theory. 
The lobbies present the government with ‘incentive contracts’ called ‘contribution 
schedules’ that induce the government to do what the industry/lobbies want the 
government to do. In contract theory, one usually uses two expressions to characterise to 
optimal contract, the incentive constraint (the agent’s first order condition taking the 
contract as given), and the participation constraint (the requirement that the expected 
reward is generous enough to induce the agent to accept the contract in the first place). In 
$
τi
MPB
MEC
τi*
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the PFS setting, the assumption of truthfulness dictates the form of the contract, so (5) is 
the incentive constraint. But what is the participation constraint? Although this point is 
not clearly laid out in the PFS framework, one has to assume that the government has the 
right to refuse contribution schedules. This assumption, which is implicit in ‘example 3’, 
implies that the lobby must ensure that the level of the government’s payoff is at least as 
high when it accepts contributions as when it does not. If the government refuses the 
contribution schedule from the industry/lobby in sector i, its optimal tariff choice is zero, 
this being a small nation. Consequently, the lobby must ensure that B is such that the 
government’s payoff is equal to its reservation payoff, namely ‘a’ times social welfare 
under free trade.  
Graphically, the size of the net contribution in industry i must equal the dead-
weight loss triangles in the standard tariff diagram. We note that these increase with the 
square of the tariff, but since the tariffs lead to a first-order large transfer to the 
industry/lobby regardless of the tariff level, but the net payments to the government are 
second-order small for small tariffs, we know that an organised industry/lobby will 
always choose to offer the contract to its agent, the government.  
 
 
3. Comparative Statics 
 
The standard comparative statics in the PFS framework involve changes in the political 
system – all of which are embodied in the parameter ‘a’ – and changes in the size of the 
industry.  
If the government becomes more concerned with welfare compared to 
contributions, ‘a’ rises. In Figure 1 this shows up as a shift up in the MEC to MEC’ (see 
Figure 2 for details). As expected, this reduces the endogenous tariff since the new 
intersection is at E’.  
An increase in the size of the industry is captured in the PFS framework as a shift 
out in the domestic supply curve. In this simple implementation here, this amounts to a 
rise in the slope of the supply curve, namely, bS. This shifts up both the MPB and the 
MEC, but it shifts up the MPB by proportionally more, so the equilibrium tariff is given 
by point E”, i.e. it is higher.  
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Figure 2: The political equilibrium tariff in the PFS-lite model 
 
$
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MPB
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